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Abstract: Recently, Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) has emerged as an al-
ternative to Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software. Now, FOSS is perceived
as a viable long-term solution that deserves careful consideration because of its po-
tential for significant cost savings, improved reliability, and numerous advantages
over proprietary software. However, the secure integration of FOSS in IT infras-
tructures is very challenging and demanding. Methodologies and technical poli-
cies must be adapted to reliably compose large FOSS-based software systems. A
DRDC Valcartier-Concordia University feasibility study completed in March 2004
concluded that the most promising approach for securing FOSS is to combine ad-
vanced design patterns and Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP). Following the
recommendations of this study a three years project have been conducted as a col-
laboration between Concordia University, DRDC Valcartier, and Bell Canada. This
paper aims at presenting the main contributions of this project. It consists of a
practical framework with the underlying solid semantic foundations for the security
evaluation and hardening of FOSS.
Keywords: Free and Open Source Software, Security Hardening, Static Analysis,
Dynamic Analysis, Aspect Oriented Programming.
1 Introduction
During the past two decades, the software market has been dominated by Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) products that offer a myriad of functionalities at reasonable prices. However,
the intrinsic limitations of COTS software such as security weaknesses, closed source code,
expensive upgrades, and lock-in effect have emerged over time. This led to the development
of a parallel “economy" based on Free and Open Source Software (FOSS). The latter refers to
software whose source code is made available for use and modification without the expensive
license fees imposed by COTS software vendors. FOSS is developed either by volunteers, non-
profit organizations, or by large computer firms who want to include “commodity" software to
give a competitive advantage to their hardware products. To date, thousands of FOSS projects
 This research is the result of a fruitful collaboration with Bell Canada and the DND/NSERC Research Partnership
Program.
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are carried out via Internet collaboration. A plethora of high-quality applications are available
for use or modification at no (or small) cost. Many of these FOSS products are widely available
and are considered to be as mature as their COTS equivalents. FOSS is now perceived as a viable
long-term solution that deserves careful consideration because of its potential for significant cost
savings, improved reliability, and support advantages over proprietary software [CC04].
Technically, the secure integration of FOSS in IT infrastructures is very challenging and
demanding. Methodologies and technical policies must be adapted to reliably compose large
FOSS-based software systems [Bol03]. This requirement is exacerbated by the fact that our de-
pendency on software will continue to grow in the next decade. Recent studies confirm that the
level of reliability and security currently offered by commercial products is clearly inadequate
and that an order of magnitude increase is needed to cope properly with cyber threats [FR03].
A DRDC Valcartier (Defence R&D Canada Valcartier)-Concordia University feasibility study,
completed in March 2004, addressed these issues and considered the technological options to
cope with the security and reliability of complex information systems including FOSS and COTS
software [CC04]. It concluded that the most promising approach is to combine advanced secu-
rity design patterns and Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP). This facilitates the separation of
the definition and implementation of quality and functional specifications. Such a “separation of
concerns" will ease the development of secure design patterns to be applied to a wide range of
applications. Time and cost investments were also evaluated for the scientific demonstration of
these concepts.
Following the recommendations of this study, a three-year project has been conducted as a
collaboration between Concordia University, DRDC Valcartier, and Bell Canada. This paper
aims at presenting the main contributions of this project. More precisely, it presents a practi-
cal framework with the underlying solid semantic foundations for the security evaluation and
hardening of free and open source software. The evaluation aims to automatically detect vul-
nerabilities in FOSS that will be corrected by the systematic injection of security code thanks to
dedicated aspect-oriented technologies. The security code is meant to be derived from security
hardening patterns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related work.
In Section 3, we present our first contribution involving static analysis and model checking
for detecting security vulnerabilities. Section 4 shows our contribution for security hardening,
which is based on aspect-orientation. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Security code analysis includes security code inspection, automatic analysis and static analy-
sis techniques. Security code inspection techniques are borrowed from software engineering
practices [Fag76] and adapted specifically for security purposes. Automatic analysis techniques
generally scan the code looking for security sensitive coding patterns that are compiled in check-
lists. The available techniques are limited to vulnerable coding patterns such as buffer overflows,
heap overflows, integer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, SQL injection, cross-site script-
ing and race conditions [Gre]. Among the tools that implement these techniques, we can cite:
Flawfinder [Whe], Coverity [Cov] and PolySpace [Pol]. Static analysis is used to predict secu-
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rity properties of programs without resorting to their execution. Static analysis techniques in-
clude flow-based analysis [BDNN01], type-based analysis [CGG02] and abstract interpretation
[CC77]. Finally, the evaluation by security testing is based on the design and execution of test
cases in order to identify vulnerabilities in the security features of the software [Her03, WTS03].
For FOSS security hardening, four approaches could be distinguished: analyzing, monitor-
ing, auditing, and rewriting [MM00]. Analysis-based techniques range from simple scanning of
code in order to detect malicious code to sophisticated semantics-based analysis of programs.
One popular form of analysis-based techniques is certified compilation, which leverages the in-
formation generated by the compiler in order to endow the code with a security certificate. This
could take the form of proofs as in PCC [Nec97], structured annotations as in ECC [Koz98],
or typing annotations with typed assembly languages TAL [MWCG99], STAL [MCGW98],
DTAL [XH99], Alias Types [SWM00], HBAL [AC03] and Linearly Typed Assembly Language
[CM03]. Nevertheless, static analysis is to some extent complex and in some regards unde-
cidable. Monitoring is based on background daemons watching the execution of a program to
prevent, at run-time, any harmful operation from taking place [HMS03]. The main drawback
of monitoring is the overhead in terms of performance that is induced by the daemons. With
auditing-based approaches, the system activity is recorded in an audit trail. This provides a se-
quence of events related to a trace of program execution and allows to track back any harmful
action. If any malicious code causes damage, the audit trail allows to do the recovery and to take
the necessary precautions for the future. As of the rewriting-based approach, the code is modi-
fied to prevent deviation from the security policies in place. A rewriting tool inserts extra code
to perform dynamic checks that ensure that “bad things” cannot happen. Among the research
contributions in rewriting-based security, we can cite [RW02].
In our project, we use aspect-orientation as an enabling technology that allows the system-
atic injection of security in FOSS. Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [KLM+97] promotes
the principle of separation of concerns, thus allowing smooth integration of security harden-
ing mechanisms inside existing software. The most prominent AOP languages are AspectJ
[KHH+01] and Hyper/J [TO00], which are built on top of Java programming language. A
similar work has also been done to provide AOP frameworks for other languages. For instance,
AspectC [CKFS01] is an aspect extension of C that is used to provide separation of concerns in
operating systems. Similarly, AspectC++ [SGS02] and AspectC# [Kim02] are respectively AOP
extensions of C++ and C# languages. Some attempts have been made to use AOP for security.
For instance, Cigital Labs have conducted a DARPA-funded project [Lab03], where the AOP
paradigm has been used to address software security. The main outcomes of this project are a
security dedicated aspect extension of C called CSAW [Lab03] and a weaving tool. De Win
[WPJV02] has explored the use of AspectJ to integrate security aspects within applications.
3 Static Analysis and Model-Checking for Vulnerability Detection
Our approach brings into a synergy static analysis and model-checking in order to leverage the
advantages and overcome the shortcomings of both techniques. The core idea is to utilize static
analysis for the automation and the optimization of program abstraction processes. Moreover,
programmers take advantage of model-checking techniques to define a wide range of system-
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specific security properties. As a result, our approach can model-check large software against
customized system-specific security properties. Our ultimate goal is to provide a security verifi-
cation technique for open source software, thus we base our approach on GCC, which is usually
a defacto open-source compiler. The language-independent and platform-independent GIMPLE
representation [Nov03] of GCC facilitates static analysis by providing easy access to flow, type,
and alias information. Being based on GIMPLE, our approach can be extended to support other
languages such as C, C++, and Java. For the verification process, we use the Moped model-
checker for pushdown systems [KSS]. The latter are known to efficiently model program execu-
tion and inter-procedural behavior. Moped has a procedural input language called Remopla to
define programs as pushdown systems. As such, the program abstraction derived from the GIM-
PLE representation is serialized into Remopla representation. In addition, we enrich program
abstractions with Remopla constructs that compute and capture data dependencies between pro-
gram expressions. Therefore, we are able to detect insidious errors that involve variable aliasing
and function parameter passing. Security properties and program Remopla model are input to
Moped in order to detect security violations and provide witness paths leading to them.
Moped allows the verification of reachability properties by looking for the reachability of
a specific statement in the Remopla code. Though interesting, this capability is not directly
sufficient for verifying security properties. In fact, a security property is the description of
a pathological behavior in the execution of a program. Such a behavior requires in general
an elaborated formalism to be specified and can rarely be stated as the simple reachability of
a specific statement in the program. To specify security properties, we use the formalism of
security automata. A security automaton is a simple automaton with two spacial states: start
and error, and transitions are mapped to instructions or statements in the program to verify. The
reachability of the error state in the security automaton when synchronized with the program
behaviors is an indication of the occurrence of the pathology. To overcome the limitation of
Moped in this regard, we translate a security automaton into a Remopla representation then
synchronize it with the Remopla model of the program in question. This comes to synchronizing
the pushdown systems of the program and the security automaton. As such, the problem of
verifying a security property is translated into detecting the reachability of the error state in the
synchronized model.
3.1 Design and Implementation
Fig. 1 depicts the architecture of our security verification environment. The security verification
of programs is carried out through different phases including security property specification,
static pre-processing, program model extraction, and property model-checking. In the following
paragraphs, we describe the input, the output, and the tasks of each of these phases.
 Phase1. Security Property Specification:
– Input: Security properties.
– Output: Remopla automata of security properties.
The first step of our verification process requires the definition of security properties de-
scribing what not to do for the purpose of building secure code. We provide users with
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a tool in order to graphically characterize the security rules that a program should obey.
Each property is specified as a finite state automaton where the nodes represent program
states and the transitions match program actions. Final states of automata are risky states
that should never be reached. To ease the property specification, our tool supports syntac-
tical pattern matching for program expressions and program statements. The graphically

























Figure 1: Security Verification Framework
 Phase2. Static Analysis for Pre-processing:
– Input: Program GIMPLE representation and security properties.
– Output: Call-graph and alias information.
Given a program and a set of security properties to verify, this process conducts call-graph
analysis and alias analysis of the program. By considering the required properties, this
phase identifies property-relevant behaviors of the analyzed program and discards those
that are irrelevant. Besides, we resort to alias analysis in order to limit the number of
tracked variables. We only consider variables that are explicitly used in security-relevant
operations together with their aliases. All other variables are discarded from the verifica-
tion process. The static pre-processing phase helps generating concise models that reduce
the size of state spaces to explore.
 Phase3. Program Model Extraction:
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– Input: Program source code and specified security properties.
– Output: Control-flow driven Remopla model or data-driven Remopla model.
Both the program and the specified properties are translated into Remopla representation
and then combined together. The combination of program models and security properties
serves the purpose of synchronizing the program behaviors with the security automaton
transitions. In other words, transitions in security automata are triggered when they match
the current program statement. Our verification approach carries out program model ex-
traction in two different modes: the control-flow driven mode and the data-driven mode.
The control-flow mode preserves in the Remopla model the flow structure of the program,
but discards data dependencies between program expressions. The resulting Remopla
model is efficiently used to detect temporal security property violations and scales to large
programs. On the other hand, our data-driven model captures data dependencies between
program expressions. Hence, it enhances the precision of our analysis and reduces the
number of false positives.
 Phase4. Program Model-Checking:
– Input: Remopla model.
– Output: Detected error traces.
Model-checking is the ultimate step of our process. The generated Remopla model is
given as input to the Moped model-checker for security verification. An error is reported
when a security automaton specified in the model reaches a risky state. The original ver-
sion of Moped has a shortcoming in a sense that it stops processing at the first encountered
error. We have done a modification to Moped in order to be able to detect more than one
error in a run. Moreover, we have developed an error trace generation functionality that
maps error traces derived from the Remopla model to actual traces from the source code.
3.2 Results and Experiments
This section demonstrates the capability of our security verification framework in detecting real
errors in large C software packages. We show that our approach can be efficiently used for un-
covering undesirable vulnerabilities in source code. The CERT secure coding website [cer] pro-
vides a valuable source of information to learn the best practices of C, C++, and Java program-
ming. It defines a standard that encompasses a set of rules and recommendations for building
secure code. Rules must be followed to prevent security flaws that may be exploitable, whereas
recommendations are guidelines that help improve the system security. The CERT standard also
makes another difference between rules and recommendations stating that compliance of a code
to rules can be verified whereas the compliance to recommendations is not always verifiable. To
assist programmers with the verification of their code, we have integrated in our tool a set of se-
cure coding rules defined in the CERT standard. As such, programmers can use our framework
to evaluate the security of their code without the need to have high security expertise. CERT
rules can mainly be classified into the following categories:
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 Deprecation rules: These rules are related to the deprecation of legacy functions that are
inherently vulnerable such as gets for user input, tmpnam for temporary file creation,
and rand for random value generation. The presence of these functions in the code should
be flagged as a vulnerability. For instance, CERT rule MSC30-C states the following “Do
not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers”.
 Temporal rules: These rules are related to a sequence of program actions that appear in
source code. For instance, the rule MEM3-C from the CERT entails to “Free dynamically
allocated memory exactly once”. Consecutive free operations on a given memory location
represents a security violation. Intuitively, these kind of rules are modeled as finite state
automata where state transitions correspond to program actions. The final state of an
automaton is the risky state that should never be reached.
 Type-based rules: These rules are related to the typing information of program expres-
sions. For instance, the rule EXP39-C from the CERT states the following “Do not
access a variable through a pointer of an incompatible type”. A type-based analysis can
be used to track violations of these kind of rules.
 Structural rules: These rules are related to the structure of source code such as variable
declarations, function inlining, macro invocation, etc. For instance, rule DCL32-C entails
to “Guarantee that mutually visible identifiers are unique”. For instance, the first charac-
ters in variable identifiers should be different to prevent confusion and facilitates the code
maintenance.
Our approach covers the first two categories of coding rules that we can formally model as
finite state automata. In fact, we cover 31 rules out of 97 rules in the CERT standard. We also
cover 21 recommendations that can be verified according to CERT. We conduct experiments that
consist in detecting the defined set of CERT coding rules against a set of well-known and widely
used open-source software. We strive to cover different kinds of security coding errors that
skilled programmers can inadvertently produce in their code. The experiments are conducted
in the two modes of our security verification tool: the control-flow mode that discards data
dependencies and the data-driven mode that establishes data dependencies between program
variables. To illustrate, Fig. 2 gives an example of a security automaton that captures the race
condition errors. This security automaton can be used to check the compliance of source code
to the following CERT rules:
 POS35-C: “Avoid race conditions while checking for the existence of a symbolic link".
 FIO01-C: “Be careful using functions that use file names for identification".
The Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use vulnerabilities (TOCTTOU) in file accesses are a clas-
sical form of race conditions. In fact, there is a time gap between the file permission check and
the actual access to the file that can be maliciously exploited to redirect the access operation
to another file. The automaton in Fig. 2 flags a check function followed by a subsequent use
function as a TOCTTOU error. The analysis results are given in Table 1. The three first columns
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CHECK = { access, stat, statfs, statvfs, lstat, readlink, tempnam, 
tmpnam, tmpnam_r }
USE = { acct, au_to_path, basename, catopen, chdir, chmod, chown, 
chroot, copylist, creat, db_initialize, dbm_open, dbminit, dirname, dlopen, 
execl, execle, execlp, execv, execve, execvp, fattach, fdetach, fopen, 
freopen, ftok, ftw, getattr, krb_recvauth, krb_set_tkt_string, kvm_open, 
lchown, link, mkdir, mkdirp, mknod, mount, nftw, nis_getservlist, 
nis_mkdir, nis_ping, nis_rmdir, nlist, open, opendir, pathconf, pathfind,  
realpath, remove, rename, rmdir, rmdirp, scandir, symlink, system, 
t_open, truncate, umount, unlink, utime, utimes, utmpname }
start errorstate1
USE(x)CHECK(x)
Figure 2: Race Condition Automaton (TOCTTOU).
define the package name, the size of the package, and the program that contains coding errors.
The number of reported errors is given in the fourth column (Reported Errors). After inspection
of the reported error traces, we classify them into three following columns: column (Err) for
potential errors, column (FP) for false positive alerts, and column (DN) for traces that are un-
decidable with manual inspection. The checking time of programs is given in the last column.
From Table 1, we demonstrate the efficiency and the usability of our approach in detecting real
errors in real-software packages. Moreover, our experiment shows that the use of data-driven
mode in our framework enhances the analysis precision. Table 2 summarizes the error traces
our tool detected during the experimentation. The properties, the number of reported traces, and
the corresponding CERT rules are given in the table, and more details of our experimentation
can be found in [TYD09].
4 FOSS Security Hardening
Software security hardening is defined in [MLD06] as any process, methodology, product or
combination that is used to add security functionalities, remove vulnerabilities or prevent their
exploitation in existing software. Security hardening practices are usually manually applied by
injecting security code into software [Bis05, HL02, Sea05]. In this section, we address the
problems related to the security hardening of FOSS. In this respect, we propose two aspect-
oriented and pattern-based approaches for systematic security hardening. The first one is built on
top of existing Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) technologies while the other one is based
on GIMPLE. Both approaches are supported by a common structure, which is based on the full
separation between the roles and duties of the security experts and the developers performing the
hardening. Such proposition constitutes a bridge that allows the security experts to provide the
best solutions to particular security problems with the details on why, how and where to apply
them. Moreover, it allows the developers to use these solutions to harden open source software
without the need to have high security expertise.
We realize the proposed structure by elaborating a programming independent and aspect-
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Table 1: Results of TOCTTOU Analysis.
Package LOC Program Reported Errors Err FP DN Model-checking time (Sec)
amanda-2.5.1p2 87K
chunker 1 0 1 0 71.6
chg-scsi 3 2 1 0 119.99
amflush 1 0 0 1 72.97
amtrmidx 1 1 0 0 70.21
taper 3 2 1 0 84.603
amfetchdump 4 1 0 3 122.95
driver 1 0 1 0 103.16
sendsize 3 3 0 0 22.67
amindexd 1 1 0 0 92.03
at-3.1.10 2.5K
atd 4 3 1 0 1.16
at 4 3 1 0 1.12
bintuils-2.19.1 986K
ranlib 1 1 0 0 2.89
strip-new 1 0 1 0 5.49
readelf 1 1 0 0 0.23
freeradius-server-2.1.3 77K radwho 1 1 0 0 1.29
inn-2.4.6 89K
nnrpd 1 1 0 0 4.11
fastrm 1 1 0 0 0.37
archive 1 0 1 0 0.95
rnews 1 1 0 0 0.57
openSSH-5.0p1 58K
ssh-agent 2 0 0 2 22.46
ssh 1 0 1 0 100.6
sshd 6 3 1 2 486.02
scp 3 2 0 1 87.95
shadow-4.1.2.2 22.7K
usermod 3 1 0 2 9.79
useradd 1 1 0 0 11.45
vipw 2 2 0 0 10.32
newusers 1 1 0 0 9.2
zebra-0.95a 142K ripd 1 1 0 0 0.46
oriented based language for security hardening called SHL, developing its corresponding parser,
compiler and integrating all of them into a framework for software security hardening. In the
following, we present the architecture, the design and implementation as well as the results and
experiments of each of the aforementioned two approaches.
4.1 Aspect-Oriented Security Hardening
This approach is based on the Security Hardening Language (SHL) that is defined in [MLD07a,
MLD07b]. We have elaborated an aspect-oriented approach to perform security hardening in a
systematic way. In this approach, security experts provide security solutions using an abstract
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Table 2: Summary of Analysis Results.
Experiment Property Reported Err FP DN CERT Rule
Error




23 23 0 0 FIO43-C
Chroot Jail 2 1 1 0 POS02-C,
FIO16-C
Memory Leak 61 11 13 37 MEM-C
Unchecked Return
value









- - - FIO33-C,
POS33-C,
MSC30-C
and a general aspect-oriented language called SHL that is expressive, human-readable, multi-
language support. This will relieve developers from the burden of security issues and let them
focus on the main functionality of programs. The security solutions are then applied in a system-
atic way eliminating the need for manual hardening. The approach provides an abstraction over
the actions that are required to improve the security of programs and adopt an aspect-oriented
approach to build and develop the solutions.
4.1.1 Architecture
We present in Fig. 3 the architecture of this approach. SHL is built on the top of the current AOP
technologies that are based on the pointcut-advice model. The solutions elaborated in SHL are
expressed by plans and patterns and can be refined into a selected AOP language. Security hard-
ening patterns are high-level and well-defined solutions to known security problems, together
with detailed information on how and where to inject each component of the solution into an
application. Security hardening plans instantiate security hardening patterns with parameters
regarding platforms, libraries and languages. The combination of hardening plans and patterns
constitutes a bridge that allows security experts to provide the best solutions to particular secu-
rity problems and allows developers to use these solutions to harden applications by developing
security hardening patterns. The development implies refinement of solutions into advices using
the existing AOP languages (e.g., AspectJ, AspectC++).
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Figure 3: Framework Architecture
4.1.2 SHL Compiler and Framework Implementation
We implement the BNF specification of SHL using ANTLR and its associated ANTLRWorks
development environment. The generated Java code allows to parse hardening plans and pat-
terns and verify the correctness of their syntax. We build on top of it a compiler that uses the
information provided by the parser to build first its data structure, then reacts upon the pro-
vided values in order to run the hardening plan and compile and run the specified pattern and its
corresponding aspect. Moreover, we integrate this compiler into a development graphical user
interface for security hardening. The resulting system provides the user with graphical facilities
to develop, compile, debug and run security hardening plans and patterns. It allows also to vi-
sualize the software to be hardened and all the compilation and integration activities performed
during the hardening. The compilation process is divided into many phases that are performed
consequently and automatically. In the sequel, we present and explain these phases.
 Plan Compilation: This phase consists of parsing the plan, verifying its syntax correctness
and building the data structure required for the other compilation phases. Any error during
the execution of this phase stops the whole compilation process and provides the developer
with information to correct the bug. This statement also applies on all the other phases.
 Pattern Compilation and Matching: A search engine is developed to find the pattern
that matches the pattern instantiations requested in the hardening plan (i.e., pattern name
and parameters). A naming convention composed of the pattern name and parameters is
adopted to differentiate between the patterns with same name but different parameters.
Once the pattern-matching the criteria is found, another check on the name and parame-
ters specified inside the pattern is applied in order to ensure that the matching is correct
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and there is no error in the naming procedure. This includes automatically parsing and
compiling the pattern contents to check the correctness of its syntax, verify the matching
result and build the data structure required for the running process.
 Aspect Matching: Once the pattern is compiled successfully, a search engine similar to
the aforementioned one is used to find the aspect corresponding to the matched pattern.
 Plan Running and Weaving: Plan running is the last phase of the compilation process.
Once the corresponding aspect is matched, the execution command is constructed based
on the information provided in the data structure, which is built during the previous com-
pilation phases. Afterwards, the aspect is woven with the specified application or module
and the resulted hardened software is produced.
 Aspect Generation: Aspect generation is an additional feature launched separately to as-
sist the developer during the refinement of a pattern by generating automatically parts of
the corresponding aspect. The generated poincuts and advices are enclosed into an aspect
that has the same name as the pattern concatenated to its parameters. The developer will
have to refine the advices’ bodies into programming language code (i.e, C++ or Java) and
then run the plan to apply the weaving.
4.2 GIMPLE-based Software Security Hardening
This approach allows applying the security hardening on the GIMPLE representation of software
[Nov03]. GIMPLE is an intermediate representation of programs. It is a language-independent
and a tree-based representation generated by the the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) [GCC]
during compilation. GCC is a compiler system supporting various programming languages,
e.g., C, C++, Objective-C, Fortran, Java, and Ada. In transforming the source code to GIMPLE,
complex expressions are split into three address codes using temporary variables. Exploiting the
intermediate representation of GIMPLE enables to define language-independent weaving se-
mantics that facilitates introducing new security-related AOP extensions. The importance of this
stems from the fact that aspect-oriented languages are language dependent. Accordingly, GIM-
PLE weaving allows defining common weaving semantics and implementation for all program-
ming languages supported by the GCC compiler instead of doing them for each AOP language.
This approach is also based on the aforementioned Security Hardening Language (SHL).
Fig. 4 illustrates the architecture of the GIMPLE weaving approach together with the one
presented in Fig. 3. The GIMPLE weaving approach bypasses the refinement step from patterns
into AOP languages. The hardening tasks specified in patterns are abstract and support multiple
languages, which makes the GIMPLE representation of software a relevant target to apply the
hardening. This is done by passing the SHL patterns and the original software to an extended
version of the GCC compiler, which at the end generates the executable of the trusted software.
For this purpose, an additional pass is added to the GCC compiler in order to interrupt the
compilation once the GIMPLE representation of the code is completed. In parallel, the hardening
pattern is compiled and a GIMPLE tree is built for each behavior using the routines of the GCC
compiler that are provided for this purpose. Afterwards, the GIMPLE trees generated from the
hardening patterns are integrated in the GIMPLE tree of the original code with respect to the





























Figure 4: Approach Architecture
location(s) specified in each behavior of the hardening pattern. Finally, the resulted GIMPLE
tree is passed again to the GCC compiler in order to continue the regular compilation process
and produce the executable of the secure software.
4.2.1 Design and Implementation of Gimple Weaving Capabilities into GCC
This implementation allows weaving patterns into the GIMPLE representation of programs be-
fore generating the corresponding executables. We handle before, after, and replace behaviors.
In addition, we target call, set, get, and withincode locations. The implementation methodol-
ogy that is adopted consists of the following steps. First, we generate a configuration file from
the SHL file. This configuration file contains all the information needed for the weaving using
our extended GCC. Then, we use the name of this configuration file as an option in a specific
command line of the extended GCC compiler. This compiler, which has weaving capabilities, is
an extension to the GCC compiler version 4.2.0. Consequently, three input files are needed by
the extended compiler to perform the weaving: a source code, a configuration file, and a library
containing the subroutines to be woven. In addition to the above option, it is required to specify
the library that contains the code to be woven. This is done through GCC’s options -l and
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-L. Then, a GIMPLE tree is built for the code of each behavior in a pattern. Afterwards, each
generated tree is injected in the program tree depending on the insertion point and the location
specified in each behavior. Once this weaving procedure is done, the GCC compiler takes over
and continues the classical compilation of the modified tree to generate the executable of the
hardened program.
4.2.2 Results and Experiments
The main contributions of this approach can be summarized as follows:
 Semantics and algorithms for matching and weaving in GIMPLE are formalized. For
this reason, a syntax for a common aspect-oriented language that is abstract and multi-
language support and a syntax for GIMPLE constructs are defined.
 Correctness and completeness of GIMPLEweaving are explored from two different views.
In the first approach, we address them according to the provided formal matching and
weaving rules and the defined algorithms in this paper. On the other hand, we accommo-
date in the second approach Kniesel’s discipline to prove that GIMPLE weaving is correct
and complete just in some specific cases because of behavior interactions and interfer-
ences.
 Implementation strategies of the proposed semantics are introduced. To explore the via-
bility and the relevance of the defined approach, case studies are developed to solve the
problems of unsafe creating of chroot jail, unsafe creating of temporary files, and using
deprecated functions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an innovative framework for security evaluation and hardening
of free and open-source software. For security evaluation, first a vulnerability detection approach
has been proposed. This approach brings into a synergy the static analysis and the model-
checking in order to leverage the advantages and overcome the shortcomings of both techniques.
We have demonstrated the efficiency and the usability of our approach in detecting real errors
in real-software packages. Moreover, our experiment shows that the use of data-driven mode
in our framework enhances the analysis precision. It is important to mention that we have
also developed a second approach to detect security vulnerabilities that is based on security
testing and code instrumentation. This approach has not been detailed in this paper for the lack
of space. Finally, we have presented a security hardening approach. The approach is aspect-
oriented and performs security hardening in a systematic way. In this approach, security experts
provide security solutions using an abstract and a general aspect-oriented language called SHL
that is expressive, human-readable, multi-language support. The use of this language relieve
developers from the burden of security issues and let them focus on the main functionality of
programs. The approach provides an abstraction over the actions that are required to improve the
security of programs and adopt an aspect-oriented approach to build and develop the solutions.
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